We introduce a new random key predistribution scheme for securing heterogeneous wireless sensor networks. Each of the n sensors in the network is classified into r classes according to some probability distribution µ = {µ 1 , . . . , µ r }. Before deployment, a class-i sensor is assigned K i cryptographic keys that are selected uniformly at random from a common pool of P keys. Once deployed, a pair of sensors can communicate securely if and only if they have a key in common. We model the communication topology of this network by a newly defined inhomogeneous random key graph. We establish scaling conditions on the parameters P and {K 1 , . . . , K r } so that this graph i) has no isolated nodes; and ii) is connected, both with high probability. The results are given in the form of zero-one laws with the number of sensors n growing unboundedly large; critical scalings are identified and shown to coincide for both graph properties. Our results are shown to complement and improve those given by Godehardt et al. and Zhao et al. for the same model, therein referred to as the general random intersection graph.
Introduction
Random key graphs are naturally induced by the Eschenauer-Gligor (EG) random key predistribution scheme [9] , which is a widely recognized solution for securing wireless sensor network (WSN) communications [4, 8] . Denoted by G(n, K, P ), random key graph is constructed on the vertices V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } as follows. Each vertex v i is assigned independently a set Σ i of K cryptographic keys that are picked uniformly at random from a pool of size P . Then, any pair of vertices v i , v j are adjacent if they share a key, i.e., if Σ i ∩Σ j = ∅. Random key graphs have recently received attention in a wide range of areas including modeling small world networks [24] , recommender systems [14] , and clustering and classification analysis [11] . Properties that have been studied include absence of isolated nodes [23] , connectivity [25, 17] , k-connectivity [27] , and k-robustness [26] , among others.
In this paper we propose and study a variation of the EG scheme that is more suitable for heterogeneous WSNs; it is in fact envisioned that many military and commercial WSN applications will consist of heterogeneous nodes [19, 18] . Namely, we assume that the network consists of sensors with varying level of resources (e.g., computational, memory, power) and possibly with varying level of security and connectivity requirements. As a result of this heterogeneity, it may no longer be sensible to assign the same number of keys to all sensors in the network as prescribed by the EG scheme. Instead, we consider a scheme where the number of keys that will be assigned to each sensor is independently drawn from the set K = {K 1 , . . . , K r } according to some probability distribution µ = {µ 1 , . . . , µ r }, for some fixed integer r. We can think of this as each vertex v x being assigned to a priority class-i with probability µ i > 0 and then receiving a key ring with the size K i associated with this class. As before, we assume that once its size is fixed, the key ring Σ x is constructed by sampling the key pool randomly and without replacement.
Let G(n; µ, K, P ) denote the random graph induced by the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme described above, where again a pair of nodes are adjacent as long as they share a key; see Section 2 for precise definitions. Inspired by the recently studied inhomogeneous Erdős-Rényi (ER) graphs [3, 5] , we refer to this graph as the inhomogeneous random key graph. The main goal of this paper is to study connectivity properties of G(n; µ, K, P ) and to understand how the parameters n, µ, K, P should behave so that the resulting graph is connected almost surely. Such results can be useful in deriving guidelines for designing heterogenous WSNs so that they are securely connected. By comparison with the results for the standard random key graph, they can also shed light on the effect of heterogeneity on the connectivity properties of WSNs.
We establish zero-one laws for the property that G(n; µ, K, P ) has no isolated nodes (see Theorem 3.1) and for the property that G(n; µ, K, P ) is connected (see Theorem 3.2). Namely, we scale the parameters K and P and provide critical conditions on this scaling such that the resulting graph almost surely has no isolated node (resp. connected) and almost surely has at least one isolated node (resp. connected), respectively, when the number of nodes n goes to infinity. We show that the critical conditions for the two graph properties coincide, meaning that absence of isolated nodes and connectivity are asymptotically equivalent properties for the inhomogeneous random key graph. Other well-known models that exhibit the same behavior include ER graphs [2] , random key graphs [25] , and random geometric graphs [16] .
Our results are also compared with the existing results by Zhao et al. [26] and Godehardt et al. [11] for the k-connectivity and connectivity, respectively, of G(n; µ, K, P ); in those references G(n; µ, K, P ) was referred to as a general random intersection graph. We show that earlier results are constrained to parameter ranges that are unlikely to be feasible in real world WSN implementations due to excessive memory requirement or very limited resiliency against adversarial attacks. On the contrary, our results cover parameter ranges that are widely regarded as feasible for most WSNs; see Section 3.3 for details.
In addition, our main results indicate that the minimum key ring size in the network has a significant impact on the connectivity of G(n; µ, K, P ), perhaps in a way that would be deemed surprising. In particular, for the standard random key graph G(n; K, P ) the critical threshold for connectivity and absence of isolated nodes is known [25, 17] to be given by
log n n and the resulting graph is asymptotically almost surely connected (resp. not connected) if c > 1 (resp. c < 1). For the inhomogeneous random key graph G(n; µ, K, P ) one would be tempted to think that an equivalent result holds under the scaling
log n n , with K avg = r j=1 µ j K j denoting the mean key ring size. Instead, we show that the zero-one laws for absence of isolated nodes and connectivity hold under
log n n , where K min stands for the minimum of {K 1 , . . . , K r }; see Corollary 3.3. This implies that in the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme, the mean number of keys required per sensor node to achieve connectivity can be significantly larger than that required in the homogeneous case. For instance, the expense of allowing an arbitrarily small fraction of sensors to keep half as many keys as in the homogeneous case would be to increase the average key ring size by two-fold.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give detailed description of the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme and the resulting inhomogeneous random key graph model. Section 3 is devoted to presenting the main results of the paper, namely the zero-one laws for absence of isolated nodes (see Theorem 3.1) and for connectivity (see Theorem 3.2) in inhomogeneous random key graphs. There, we also compare our results with relevant work from the literature and also comment on the implications of our results on designing secure sensor networks. In Section 4, we present some preliminary technical results that will be useful in proving the main results of the paper. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is outlined in Section 5 with necessary technical steps completed in Section 6. We start the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Section 7 and complete it in Sections 8 through Section 10.
We close with a word on notation and conventions in use. All limiting statements, including asymptotic equivalences, are understood with the number of sensor nodes n going to infinity. The random variables (rvs) under consideration are all defined on the same probability triple (Ω, F, P). Probabilistic statements are made with respect to this probability measure P, and we denote the corresponding expectation and variance operators by E and var, respectively. We use the notation = st to indicate distributional equality. The indicator function of an event E is denoted by 1 [E], while E c denotes the complement of E. We say that an even holds with high probability (whp) if it holds with probability 1 as n → ∞. For any discrete set S we write |S| for its cardinality. In comparing the asymptotic behaviors of the sequences {a n }, {b n }, we use a n = o(b n ), a n = w(b n ), a n = O(b n ), a n = Ω(b n ), and a n = Θ(b n ), with their meaning in the standard Landau notation. We also use a n ∼ b n to denote the asymptotic equivalence lim n→∞ a n /b n = 1.
Model Definitions
Consider a network that consists of n sensor nodes labeled as v 1 , . . . , v n . Our key predistribution idea is based on classifying the nodes in this network into r sets (e.g., depending on their level of importance) and then assigning different number of cryptographic keys to sensors based on their class. Assume that each of the n nodes in the network are independently assigned to a class according to some probability distribution µ : {1, . . . , r} → (0, 1). Namely, with t x denoting the class (or, type) of node v x , we have
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , n. Then, a class-i node is assigned K i keys that are selected uniformly at random from a pool of size P , for each i = 1, . . . , r. More precisely, the key ring Σ x of a node x is an P Kt x -valued random variable (rv) where P A denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , P } which contain exactly A elements -Obviously, we have |P A | = P A . It is further assumed that the rvs Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n are independent and identically distributed.
Let K = (K 1 , . . . , K r ) and µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ r ). Without loss of generality we assume that
Consider a random graph G defined on the vertex set V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } such that two nodes v x and v y are adjacent, denoted v x ∼ v y , if they have at least one key in common in their corresponding key rings. Namely, we have
The adjacency condition (1) defines the inhomogeneous random key graph, hereafter denoted G(n; µ, K, P ). The name is reminiscent of the recently studied inhomogeneous random graph [3] model where nodes are again divided into r classes, and a class i node and a class j node are connected with probability p ij independent of everything else. This independence disappears in the inhomogeneous random key graph case, but one can still compute p ij as
In view of (2), our key predistribution scheme results in higher priority nodes (i.e., nodes with more assigned keys) connecting with each other with higher probability; see Proposition 4.1. In presenting our results below, we shall make use of the mean probability of edge occurrence for each node class. Namely, we define
where p ij denotes the probability that a node of class-i and a node of class-j have an edge in between; see (2) . It is easy to see that the mean number of edges incident on a node (i.e., the degree of a node) of class-i is given by (n − 1)λ i . Throughout, we assume that the number of classes r is fixed and do not scale with n, and so are the probabilities µ 1 , . . . , µ r > 0. All remaining parameters are assumed to be scaled with n, and we shall be interested in the properties of the resulting inhomogeneous random key graph as n grows unboundedly large. The dependence of scheme parameters and events on n will be denoted by a subscript, while that of some variables will be denoted by a parenthesis. For instance, we define
and
3 Main Results and Discussion
The results
Our main results are presented next. To fix the terminology, we refer to any mapping K 1 , . . . , K r , P :
as a scaling as long as the conditions
are satisfied for all n = 2, 3, . . .. To simplify the notation, we also let K n = (K 1,n , K 2,n , . . . , K r,n ). We first present a zero-one law for the absence of isolated nodes in inhomogeneous random key graphs.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a probability distribution µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ r ) with µ i > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r, and a scaling K 1 , . . . , K r , P :
for some c > 0. Then, we have
A proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found in Section 5. The scaling condition (7) will often be used in the equivalent form
with lim n→∞ c n = c > 0.
Next, we present an analogous result for the property of graph connectivity.
Theorem 3.2 Consider a probability distribution µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ r ) with µ i > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r, and a scaling K 1 , . . . , K r , P :
such that (7) holds for some c > 0. Under the assumptions
we have
The condition (10) implies that there exists a constant σ > 0 such that
for all n = 2, 3, . . . sufficiently large. In words, Theorem 3.1 (resp. Theorem 3.2) states that the inhomogeneous random key graph G(n; µ, K n , P n ) has no isolated node (resp. is connected) whp if the mean degree of "the nodes that have the least number of keys" is scaled as (1 + ǫ) log n for some ǫ > 0; in view of Proposition 4.1, the nodes that are assigned the least number of keys have the minimum mean-degree in the graph. On the other hand, if this minimal mean degree scales like (1 − ǫ) log n for some ǫ > 0, then whp G(n; µ, K n , P n ) has a node that is isolated, and hence not connected. The additional conditions (10) and (11) are enforced here merely for technical reasons and are required only for the one-law part of the connectivity result, Theorem 3.2. A detailed discussion on these additional conditions is given in Section 3.2, where we explain why they are likely to hold in many real-world WSN applications. There, we also discuss how and when these conditions can be relaxed or replaced by milder conditions.
Our results demonstrate that the inhomogeneous random key graph provides one more example random graph model where the properties of absence of isolated nodes and connectivity are asymptotically equivalent. Other well-known examples include Erdős-Rényi graphs [2] , random key graphs [25] , random geometric graphs [16] , and intersection of random key graphs and ER graphs [21] . Our results are also analogous to the recent findings by Levroye and Freiman [5] for the connectivity of inhomogeneous Erdős-Rényi graph model, where nodes are classified into r classes independently according to a probability distribution µ and an edge is drawn between a class-i and a class-j node with probability p ij (n) independent of everything else. With λ i (n) defined as in (5), their result states that if min i=1,...,r λ i (n) ∼ c log n/n then with c > 1 (resp. c < 1) the corresponding graph is connected (resp. not connected) whp, under some additional technical conditions. 1 We now present a corollary that states the zero-one laws of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 under a different scaling condition than (7). This alternative formulation will make it easier to derive design guidelines for dimensioning heterogeneous key predistribution schemes, namely in adjusting key ring sizes K 1 , . . . , K r and probabilities µ 1 , . . . , µ r such that the resulting network i) has no isolated sensors and ii) is connected, both whp. Corollary 3.3 Consider a probability distribution µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ r ) with µ i > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling K 1 , . . . , K r , P : N 0 → N r+1 0 . Let |Σ| n denote a rv that takes the value K i,n with probability µ i for each i = 1, . . . , r. If it holds that
for some c > 0, then we have the zero-one law (8) for absence of isolated nodes. If, in addition, the the conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied by this scaling, then we also have the zero-one law (12) for connectivity.
A proof of Corollary 3.3 is given in Appendix A, where we show that the scaling conditions (7) and (14) are indeed equivalent to each other, meaning that one can obtain both Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 from Corollary 3.3, and vice versa. We remark that E [|Σ| n ] gives the mean number of keys assigned to a sensor in the network. With this in mind, Corollary 3.3 provides various design choices to ensure that no sensor is isolated in the network: One just has to set the minimum and average key ring sizes such that their multiplication scales as (1 + ǫ)
Pn log n n for some ǫ > 0. We also see from Corollary 3.3 that such a scaling would also ensure connectivity as long as the additional conditions (10)- (11) are also satisfied.
To compare with the homogeneous random key predistribution scheme, set r = 1 and consider a universal key ring size K n in Corollary 3.3. This leads to zero-one laws for the absence of isolated nodes and connectivity in the standard random key graph G(n; K n , P n ). Namely, with
analogs of (8) and (12) are obtained for G(n; K n , P n ); these results had already been established [23, 25] by the authors (in stronger forms). An interesting observation is that minimum key ring size has a dramatic impact on the connectivity properties of inhomogeneous random key graph. To provide a simple and concrete example, set P n = n log n. In the homogeneous case, we see from (15) that the universal key ring size has to scale as K n = (1 + ǫ) log n for some ǫ > 0 to ensure that the network is free of isolated nodes and is connected. In the heterogeneous case, one gains the flexibility of having a positive fraction of sensors in the network with substantially smaller number of keys. For the absence of isolated nodes, a positive fraction of sensors can be assigned as few as one key per node. However, from Corollary 3.3 we see that this comes at the expense of having to assign a substantially larger key rings to a positive fraction of other sensors in the network. More precisely, if K 1,n = O(1) then we must have K r,n = Ω((log n) 2 ) to have no isolated nodes under the same setting. For connectivity on the other hand, we see from (16) that the minimum key ring size K 1,n can be kept on the order of O( √ log n) and connectivity can still be achieved with mean key ring size satisfying O((log n) 1.5 ). (10)- (11) of Theorem 3.2
Comments on the technical conditions
We now provide a detailed discussion on the technical conditions (10) and (11) enforced in Theorem 3.2. We will focus on i) the feasibility of these additional conditions for real-world WSN implementations, and ii) when and how they can be replaced with milder conditions.
We start with the condition (10) that states the key pool size grows at least linearly with the network size n. In terms of applicability in the context of heterogeneous key predistribution schemes in WSNs, this condition is not stringent at all. In fact, it is often needed that key pool size P n be much larger than the network size n [6, 7, 9] as otherwise the network will be extremely vulnerable against node capture attacks. From a technical point of view, the case where P n = Ω(n) is also the more interesting and challenging one as compared to the case where P n = o(n). For instance, when P n = O(n δ ) for some 0 < δ < 1/2, the inhomogeneous random key graph G(n; µ, K n , P n ) can be shown to be connected for any µ as long as K 1,n ≥ 2 ; see [22, Lemma 8 .1] for a proof of a similar result for the standard random key graph. This means that if P n = O(n δ ) with δ < 1/2, even two keys per sensor node is enough to get network connectivity whp. Finally, we remark that the scaling condition (7) or its equivalent (14) already implies that P n = Ω(
Next, we look at the condition (11) and start with discussing possible relaxations. First of all, (11) is stronger than what is actually needed for our proof to work; it is enforced to enable a shorter proof and an easier exposition of the main result. By inspection of the arguments in Section 10.4, it can be seen that (11) can be replaced with
with some β > 0 and ν > 0 to be specified, and for any ǫ > 0 and any finite integer M ; the details are omitted here for brevity.
As we look at (16), we see that K 1,n = w(1) is needed for any µ r . In fact, this condition can easily be satisfied in real-world WSN implementations given that key ring sizes on order of O(log n) are regarded as feasible for most sensor networks [7] . Considered in combination with (14) , other conditions enforced in (16) bounds the variability in the key ring sizes used in the network. In particular, given that
implies
= O (log n) when µ r ≤ 0.75 and
75. Thus, we see that when more than 75 % of the sensors receive the largest key rings, one can afford to use much smaller key rings for the remaining sensors, as compared to the case when µ r ≤ 0.75.
Collecting, while conditions enforced in (16) take away from the flexibility of assigning very small key rings to a certain fraction of sensors (as we were allowed to do for the absence of isolated nodes), they can still be satisfied easily in most real-world implementations. To provide a concrete example, one can set P n = n log n and have K 1,n = (log n) 1/2+ǫ and E [|Σ| n ] = (1 + ǫ)(log n) 3/2−ǫ with any ǫ > 0; in view of Theorem 3.2 and (16) the resulting network will be connected whp. With the same P n , it is possible to have much smaller K 1,n when µ r > 0.75. For example, we can have K 1,n = log log · · · log n and E [|Σ| n ] = Ω((log n) 2 ). Of course, one can also have all key ring sizes on the same order and set K 1,n = c 1 log n and E [|Σ| n ] = c 2 log n with c 1 c 2 > 1, to obtain a connected WSN whp.
Comparison with related work
The random graph model G(n; µ, K n , P n ) considered here is also known as general random intersection graphs in the literature; e.g., see [26, 1, 10] . To the best of our knowledge this model has been first considered by Godehardt and Jaworski [10] and by Goderhardt et al. [11] . Results for both the existence of isolated nodes and graph connectivity have been established; see below for a comparison of these results with those established here. Later, Bloznelis et al. [1] analyzed the component evolution problem in the general random intersection graph and provided scaling conditions for the existence of a giant component. There, they also established that under certain conditions G(n; µ, K n , P n ) behaves very similarly with a standard Erdős-Rényi graph [2] . Taking advantage of this similarity, Zhao et al. [26] established various results for the k-connectivity and k-robustness of the general random intersection graph by means of a coupling argument.
We now compare our results with those established in the literature. Our main argument is that previous results for the connectivity of inhomogeneous random key graphs are constrained to very narrow parameter ranges that are impractical for wireless sensor network applications. In particular, we will argue below that the result by Zhao et al. [26] is restricted to very large key ring sizes, rendering them impractical for resource-constrained sensor networks. On the other hand, the results by Godehardt et al. [10, 1] focus on fixed key ring sizes that do not grow with the network size n. As a consequence, in order to ensure connectivity, their result requires a key pool size P n that is much smaller than typically prescribed for security and resiliency purposes.
To fix the terminology, let D n : {1, 2, . . . , P n } → [0, 1] be the probability distribution used for drawing the size of the key rings Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ; as before, once its size is fixed a key ring is formed by sampling a key pool with size P n randomly and without replacement. The graph G(n; D n , P n ) is then defined on the vertices {v 1 , . . . , v n } and contains an edge between any pair of nodes v x and v y as long as Σ x ∩ Σ y = ∅. The model G(n; µ, K n , P n ) considered here constitutes a special case of G(n; D n , P n ) under the assumption that the support of D n has a fixed size of r.
With these definitions in mind we now state the results by Zhao et al. [26] and by Goderhardt et al. [11] , respectively.
Theorem 3.4 [26, Theorem 1]
Consider a general random intersection graph G(n, D n , P n ). Let |Σ| n be a random variable following the probability distribution D n . With a sequence α n for all n defined through
n(log n) 2 and |α n | = o(log n), then
Theorem 3.5 [11, Theorem 2] Consider a general random intersection graph G(n, D, P n ), where D(ℓ) = 0 for all ℓ > r and ℓ = 0. Namely, all key ring sizes are bound to be on the interval [1, r] . Let |Σ| be a random variable following the probability distribution D. Then if
Also, if D(r) = 1 for some r ≥ 2, and it holds that
In comparing Theorems 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5, it is worth noting that k-connectivity is a stronger property than connectivity, which in turn is stronger than absence of isolated nodes. However, although Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 consider strong graph properties, we now argue why the established results are not likely to be applicable for real-world sensor networks. First, Theorem 3.5 focuses on the case where all possible key rings have a finite size that do not scale with n. In addition, with E [|Σ|] fixed, it is clear that the scaling conditions (18) and (19) both require
Unfortunately, it is often needed that key pool size P n be much larger than the network size n [9, 7] as otherwise the network will be extremely vulnerable against node capture attacks. In fact, one can see that with (20) in effect, an adversary can compromise a significant portion of the key pool (and, hence network communication) by capturing o(n) nodes. We now focus on Theorem 3.4, where the major problem arises from the assumption
For the model to be deemed as inhomogeneous random key graph, the variance of the key ring size should be non-zero. In fact, given that key ring sizes are integer-valued, the simplest possible case would be that D(K + 1) = µ and D(K) = 1 − µ for some 0 < µ < 1 and positive integer K. This would amount to assigning either K + 1 or K keys to each node with probabilities µ and 1 − µ, respectively. In this case, we can easily see that var[|Σ|] = µ(1 − µ) > 0 as long as 0 < µ < 1. Therefore, for an inhomogeneous random key graph, the condition (21) implies that
n(log n) 2 = w(1), or, equivalently that
Put differently, Theorem 3.4 enforces mean key ring size to be much larger than √ n log n. However, a typical wireless sensor network will consist of a very large number of sensors, each with very limited memory and computational capability [9, 7] . As a result, key rings with size w( √ n log n) are unlikely to be implementable in most practical network deployments. In fact, it was suggested by Di Pietro et al. [7] that key rings with size O(log n) are acceptable for sensor networks. In comparison, our results Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 do not require either of the unrealistic conditions (20) or (22) . To see this, note that the enforced scaling condition (9) or its equivalent (14) implies (see also Lemma 4.3))
It is clear that this condition does not require (20) , and in fact already enforces P n = Ω(n/ log n).
As mentioned earlier, in real-world implementations the key pool size is expected to grow at least linearly with n so that the additional condition (10) of Theorem 3.2 is automatically satisfied. The second additional condition (11) of our connectivity result and (23) can also be satisfied simultaneously without requiring the prohibitively large key ring sizes given at (22) . To provide concrete examples, we can use P n = Θ(n log n), K 1,n = Θ(log n) and K r,n = Θ(log n), or P n = Θ(n log n), K 1,n = Θ( √ log n) and K r,n = Θ((log n) 3/2 ). With proper choice of constants in these scalings, we will ensure that i) the resulting WSN is connected almost surely; ii) the key pool size is much larger than the network so that the resulting WSN has good level of resiliency against node capture attacks; and iii) the maximum key ring size used in the network is on the order of the ranges log n or (log n) 3/2 that are usually regarded as feasible [9, 7] ; these choices also lead to a much smaller mean key ring size than that prescribed in (22) .
In conclusion, we showed that our results enable parameter choices that are widely regarded as practical in real-world sensor networks, while previous results given in [26] and [11] do not.
Preliminaries
In this section, we establish several preliminary results that will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. The first result states that mean edge probabilities are ordered in the same way with the key ring sizes. 
for each n = 2, 3, . . ..
Proof. In view of (5), the desired result (24) will follow immediately if we show that p ij (n) is increasing in both i and j. Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and recall that K i increases as i increases. For any i, j such that K i + K j > P we see from (2) that p ij (n) = 1; otherwise if K i + K j ≤ P we have p ij (n) < 1. Thus, given that K i + K j increases with both i and j, it will be enough to show that p ij (n) increases with both i and j on the range where K i + K j ≤ P . But, on that range, we have
It is now immediate that (
decreases with both K i and K j , and hence with i and j. Hence, p ij (n) is seen to be increasing with i and j, and this establishes Proposition 4.1.
A useful consequence of Proposition 4.1 is given next. 
and under either condition we have the asymptotic equivalence
Proof. Lemma 4.2 can easily be established by following the same arguments used in [25, Lemma 7.3] or [20, Lemma 7.4.4] , namely by applying crude bounds (upper and lower) to the expression (25) . The details are ommitted here for brevity.
Next, we give a result that collects several useful consequences of the scaling condition (7) under (11). such that (7) holds for some c > 0. We have
If in addition (11) holds, we have
Proof. The scaling condition (9) states that
µ j p 1j (n) = c n log n n with lim n→∞ c n = c > 0. From the proof of Proposition (4.1) we know that p ij (n) increases with i and j under any scaling. Thus, we readily obtain that
Since µ r > 0 this gives p 1r (n) = Θ log n n = o(1), whence we get (26) is readily established. We also find it useful to state the more detailed bounds
easily seen to be valid for any n = 2, 3, . . . sufficiently large in view of (28).
We now turn to establishing (27) . Comparing (26) with (11), we get
Next, we multiply (26) with (30) to get
Invoking Lemma 4.2 with i = j = r, we obtain (27).
The following inequality will also be useful in our proof.
Proposition 4.4 For any set of positive integers K 1 , . . . , K r , P , and any scalar a ≥ 1, we have
Proof.
Fix i, j = 1, 2, . . . , r. Observe that
≥ 0 so that (31) holds trivially if K j + ⌈aK i ⌉ > P . Assume here onwards that K j + ⌈aK i ⌉ ≤ P . Recalling (25), we find
In view of (32) and (33), the desired inequality (31) will follow if we show that
For each ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , K j − 1, (34) follows as we note that
and (31) is now established.
In the course of proving Theorem 3.1 we often make use of the decomposition
with Ψ(x) := 
Finally, we find it useful to derive a bound on p ij . Starting with (25) we write
A proof of Theorem 3.1 -Establishing the zero-one law for absence of isolated nodes
The proof of Theorem 3.1 passes through applying the method of first and second moments [12, p. 55 ] to the number of isolated nodes in G(n; µ, K, P ). To simplify the notation, we let θ = (K, P ). Let I n (µ, θ) denote the total number of isolated nodes in G(n; µ, θ); i.e.,
Establishing the one-law
Consider now a scaling θ :
such that (7) holds with c > 1. The random graph G(n; µ, θ n ) has no isolated nodes if and only if I n (µ, θ n ) = 0. The method of first moment [12, Eqn. (3.10), p. 55] gives
whence the one-law lim n→∞ P [I n (µ, θ n ) = 0] = 1 will follow if we show that
By exchangeability of the indicator functions appearing at (38), we find
Conditioning on the class of v 1 , we further get
where (42) follows from the fact that rvs {v 1 ∼ v j } n j=2 are conditionally independent given the key ring Σ 1 of node v 1 . Conditioning further on the class of v 2 , we find
Using (43) in (42), and recalling (24) we get
log n−cn log n n−1 n as we also use (9). Letting n go to infinity in this last expression we immediately get
since lim n→∞ 1 − c n n−1 n = 1 − c < 0 under the enforced assumptions. Invoking (41) we now get (40) and the one-law is established.
Establishing the zero-law
This section is devoted to establishing the zero-law in Theorem 3.1, namely the fact that inhomogeneous random key graph contains at least one isolated node when the scaling condition (7) is satisfied with c < 1. We will establish this by applying the method of second moment [12, Remark 3.1, p. 55] to a variable that counts nodes that are class-1 and isolated. Clearly, if we show that whp there exists at least one class-1 node that is isolated, then the desired zero-law will follow.
Let Y n (µ, θ) denote the number of isolated nodes in G(n; µ, θ n ) that are class-1. Namely, with χ n,i (µ, θ) denoting the indicator function that node v i is isolated and belongs to class-1, we have Y n (µ, θ) = n ℓ=1 χ n,ℓ (µ, θ). The second moment method states the inequality
Also, by exchangeability and the binary nature of the rvs χ n,1 (µ, θ), . . . , χ n,n (µ, θ), we have
It then follows that
From (44) and (46) we see that
However, since Fix n = 2, 3, . . ., and pick u and θ. We have
by virtue of the fact that the events {v 1 ∼ v j } n j=2 are independent conditionally on Σ 1 . Invoking (43), we then get
Now, consider a scaling K 1 , . . . , K r , P :
such that (9) holds with lim n→∞ c n = c > 0. Using this scaling in (53) and recalling (35) we get
The desired result (50) is now immediate as we recall (36) 
A proof of Proposition 5.2
We start by obtaining an expression for the probability that nodes v 1 and v 2 are class-1 and isolated in G(n; µ, θ). We get
upon conditioning on the class of v 3 . Similarly, it is easy to see that
Combining (55) and (56), we find
Consider a scaling θ :
such that (7) holds with c < 1. Reporting this scaling into the last expression, we see that
With p ij (n) increasing with i and j as shown in Proposition 4.1, it is also clear that
Finally, we note from Proposition 4.4 that
Let Z n (µ, θ n ) denote a rv such that
with probability µ j , j = 1, . . . , r.
Applying (58), (59), and (60) in (57) we see that the desired result (49) will follow upon showing lim sup
We note that
and that
Hence, we will obtain (61) if we show that
In order to bound the variance of Z n (µ, θ n ), we use Popoviciu's inequality [13, p. 9] . Namely, for any bounded rv X with maximum value of M and minimum value of m, we have
It is clear from the discussion given in the proof of Proposition 4.1 that
holds for any scaling. Applying Popoviciu's inequality, we then get
Reporting the upper bound in (28) into (64) we now find
Letting n go to infinity in this last expression, we immediately get (63) as we note that µ r > 0 and lim n→∞ c n = c > 0. This establishes (61) and the desired result (49) now follows.
A proof of Theorem 3.2 -Establishing the zero-one law for connectivity
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is technically more involved than that of Theorem 3.1. To that end, we outline the main arguments leading to the proof in this section and complete the remaining steps in several sections that follow. Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider u and θ = (K, P ). We define the event
and recall that
If the random graph G(n; µ, θ) is connected, then it does not contain any isolated node, whence C n (µ, θ) is a subset of [I n (u, θ) = 0], and the conclusions
follow. Taken together with Theorem 3.1, the relations (66) and (67) pave the way to proving Theorem 3.2. To see this, pick any scaling K 1 , . . . , K r , P :
such that (7) holds for some c > 0. If c < 1, then lim n→∞ P [I n (u, θ n ) = 0] = 0 by the zero-law for the absence of isolated nodes (see Theorem 3.1), whence lim n→∞ P [C n (µ, θ n )] = 0 with the help of (66). If c > 1, then lim n→∞ P [I n (u, θ n ) = 0] = 1 by the one-law for the absence of isolated nodes, and the desired conclusion lim n→∞ P [C n (µ, θ n )] = 1 (or equivalently, lim n→∞ P [C n (µ, θ n ) c ] = 0) will follow via (67) if we show the following:
such that (7) holds for some c > 1, we have lim
as long as the conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied.
In words, Proposition 7.1 states that the probability of the inhomogeneous random key graph being not connected despite having no isolated nodes diminishes asymptotically under the enforced assumptions. In fact, the asymptotic equivalence of graph connectivity and absence of isolated nodes is a well-known phenomenon in many classes of random graphs; e.g., ER graphs [2] , random key graphs [25] , and intersection of random key graphs and ER graphs [21] .
The basic idea in establishing Proposition 7.1 is to find a sufficiently tight upper bound on the probability in (68) and then to show that this bound goes to zero as n becomes large. Our approach is in the same vein with the one used for proving the one-law for connectivity in ER graphs [2, p. 164] . This approach has already proved useful in establishing one-laws for connectivity in the standard random key graph [25] and its intersection with an ER graph [21] . Throughout the proof of the one-law for connectivity in inhomogeneous random key graphs, several intermediate results will be borrowed directly from [25, 21] to avoid duplication.
We begin by deriving the needed upper bound on the term (68). Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider u and θ = (K, P ). For reasons that will later become apparent we will need bounds on the number of distinct keys held by a specific set S of sensors; just to give a hint, this will help us efficiently bound the probability that the sensors in S are isolated from the rest of the network. To that end, we define the event E n (µ, θ; X) via
where N = {1, . . . , n} and X = [X 1 X 2 · · · X n ] is an n-dimensional integer-valued array. Let
and set
for some β, γ in (0, 1 2 ) that will be specified later. With this setting, E n (µ, θ; X) encodes the event that for at least one ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, the total number of distinct keys held by at least one set of ℓ sensors is less than
Below, we will show that by a careful selection of β and γ, we can have the complement of E n (µ, θ n ; X n ) take place whp under the enforced assumptions on the scaling θ : N 0 → N r+1 0 ; i.e., for all ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, the total number of keys held by any set of ℓ sensors will be at least
The relevance of this is easily seen as we use a simple bounding argument to write
It is now clear that the proof of Proposition 7.1 and hence that of Theorem 3.2 will consist of establishing the following two results.
such that (7) holds for some c > 1, (13) is satisfied for some σ > 0, and (11) holds. We have
where X n = [X 1,n · · · X n,n ] is as specified in (70) with β in (0,
and γ in (0,
A proof of Proposition 7.2 can be found in Section 8. Note that for any σ > 0, lim β↓0 β such that (7) holds for some c > 1, (13) is satisfied for some σ > 0, and (11) holds. We have
where X n = [X 1,n · · · X n,n ] is as specified in (70) with γ in (0, The proof of Proposition 7.2 will follow similar steps to [21, Proposition 7.2] and rely heavily on the results obtained by the author in [20] . Using a standard union bound we first write
where N n,ℓ denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , n} with exactly ℓ elements. Let U ℓ (µ, θ) be given by
By using exchangeability and the fact that |N n,ℓ | = n ℓ , we get
Now, consider any scaling
and recall the ordering (6) of the key ring sizes. For any ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n define U ℓ (K 1,n , P n ) as
In other words, U ℓ (K 1,n , P n ) stands for the rv that has the same distribution with U ℓ (µ, θ n ) when µ is degenerate with µ 1 = 1 and µ j = 0 for all j = 2, . . . , r; i.e., when all key ring sizes are equal to K 1 . With this setting, U ℓ (K 1,n , P n ) is equivalent to the rv defined similarly for the standard random key graph in [25, 21, 20] , where it was often denoted by U ℓ (θ n ) with θ n = (K n , P n ). Given (6), it is a simple matter to check that
with denoting the usual stochastic ordering. This can be seen by an easy coupling argument where all sensors first receive K 1,n keys and then an additional K ℓ,n −K 1,n keys are assigned to each sensor independently with probability µ ℓ . Since additionally distributed keys can only increase the variable U ℓ , we obtain (76).
Reporting (76) into (75) we now get
Assume now that the scaling under consideration satisfies (7) for some c > 1, (13) with σ > 0, and (11) . It was shown [20, Proposition 7.4.14, p. 142 ] that for any scaling K 1 , P : N 0 → N 0 × N 0 such that (13) holds for some σ > 0, we have
whenever γ in (0,   1 2 ) is selected so that (73) holds; see also [20, Proposition 7.4.17, p. 152] . Hence, the desired conclusion (71) will follow if we show that
under the condition (72). However, it can be seen from [20, Proposition 7.4.13, p. 140] and [20, Proposition 7.4.16, p. 146 ] that with β in (0 ,   1 2 ) small enough to ensure (72) we have (78) for any scaling K 1 , P : N 0 → N 0 × N 0 such that K 1,n = w(1). With this last condition clearly ensured under (13) and (11) we obtain (78). The proof of Proposition 7.2 is now completed.
A proof of Proposition 7.3
We will now work towards establishing (74), namely showing that the probability of G(n; µ n , θ n ) being not connected despite having no isolated nodes approaches zero as n gets large under the event E n (µ, θ n ; X n ) c . Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider u and θ = (K, P ). For any non-empty subset S of nodes, i.e., S ⊆ V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, we define the graph G(n; µ, θ)(S) (with vertex set S) as the subgraph of G(n; µ, θ) restricted to the nodes in S. With each non-empty subset S of nodes, we associate several events of interest: Let C n (µ, θ; S) denote the event that the subgraph G(n; µ, θ)(S) is itself connected. It is clear that C n (µ, θ; S) is completely determined by the rvs {Σ i , v i ∈ S}. We say that S is isolated in G(n; µ, θ) if there are no edges between the nodes in S and the nodes in the complement S c = {v 1 , . . . , v n } − S. Let B n (µ, θ; S) denote the event that S is isolated in G(n; µ, θ), i.e.,
Finally, we set A n (µ, θ; S) := C n (µ, θ; S) ∩ B n (µ, θ; S).
Our main argument towards establishing (74) relies on the following key observation: If G(n; µ, θ) is not connected and yet has no isolated nodes, then there must exist a subset S of nodes with |S| ≥ 2 such that G(n; µ, θ)(S) is connected while S is isolated in G(n; µ, θ). This is captured by the inclusion
It is also clear that this union need only be taken over all subsets S of {v 1 , . . . , v n } with 2 ≤ |S| ≤ ⌊ n 2 ⌋. We now apply a standard union bound argument to (79) and get
where V n,ℓ denotes the collection of all subsets of {v 1 , . . . , v n } with exactly ℓ elements. For each ℓ = 1, . . . , n, we simplify the notation by writing A n,ℓ (µ, θ) := A n (µ, θ; {v 1 , . . . , v ℓ }), B n,ℓ (µ, θ) := B n (µ, θ; {v 1 , . . . , v ℓ }) and C n,ℓ (µ, θ) := C n (µ, θ; {v 1 , . . . , v ℓ }). With a slight abuse of notation, we use C n (µ, θ) for ℓ = n as defined before. Under the enforced assumptions, exchangeability yields
and the expression
follows since |V n,ℓ | = n ℓ . Substituting into (80) we obtain the key bound
Next, we derive bounds for the probabilities appearing at (82). Recall the definitions (2) and (3).
where |Σ| denotes a rv such that |Σ| = K j with probability µ j , j = 1, . . . , r.
Proof. We start by observing the equivalence
Hence, under the enforced assumptions on the rvs Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n , we readily obtain the expression
where |Σ| denotes a rv that takes the value K j with probability µ j for each j = 1, . . . , r. Note that we always have
where in the last step we also used (37). Conditioning on the rvs Σ 1 , . . . , Σ ℓ which fully determine the event C n,ℓ (µ, θ)), we conclude via (84) that
In view of this last bound, Proposition 9.1 will be established if we show that
To see why (85) holds, observe that the subgraph of G(n; µ, θ) on the vertices v 1 , . . . , v ℓ , hereafter denoted G ℓ (n; µ, θ), is connected if and only if it contains a spanning tree. Let T ℓ denote the collection of all spanning trees on the vertex set {v 1 , . . . , v ℓ }. Then, we have
By Cayley's formula [15] there are ℓ ℓ−2 trees on ℓ vertices, i.e., |T ℓ | = ℓ ℓ−2 . In addition, for any T in T ℓ , it is clear that
since K r ≥ K j for any j = 1, 2, . . . , r − 1; i.e., probability that the tree T is contained in this subgraph is maximized when all the nodes in the subgraph belong to class-r that are assigned the largest number of keys. With µ r = 1, G ℓ (n; µ, θ) becomes equivalent to the standard random key graph G ℓ (n; K r , P ) for which it is known [25, Lemma 9.1] that
This follow from the fact that a tree on ℓ nodes consists of ℓ − 1 edges and that edge events in the random key graph are pairwise independent. Collecting, we obtain via a union bound that
This establishes (85) and the proof of Proposition (9.1) is now completed. Now, consider a scaling θ :
as in the statement of Proposition 7.3. Using this scaling in (82) together with (83) we see that the proof of Proposition 7.3 will be completed once we show
Combined with Proposition 7.2, this will lead to Proposition 7.1 and hence to Theorem 3.2. To that end, we devote the rest of the paper to establishing (86). Throughout, we make repeated use of the standard bounds
where the latter follows from the Binomial formula.
Establishing (86)
We will establish (86) in several steps with each step focusing on a specific range of the summation over ℓ. Throughout this section, we consider a scaling K 1 , . . . , K r , P :
such that (7) holds for some c > 1, (10) holds for some σ > 0 and (11) 
The case where 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ R
The first range considers fixed values of ℓ. For the moment, fix an integer R that will be specified later in Section 10.2; see (96). For each ℓ = 2, . . . , R we use (87), (27) , and (7) to get
upon noting that lim n→∞ 1 − c n n−ℓ n = 1 − c < 0 on the given range of ℓ. Thus, for any R we have
10.2 The case where R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ µrn 2βc log n Next, we handle the range where R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ µr n 2βc log n . Noting that K 1,n ≤ K r,n , we realize from (26) that
, or equivalently that
= Ω n log n . Also, (10) and (11) imply together that K 1,n = w(1), leading to Pn K 1,n = w n log n . Hence, on the range under consideration here, we have ℓ ≤ L n = min(⌊ Pn K 1,n ⌋, ⌊ n 2 ⌋) so that X ℓ,n = ⌊βℓK 1,n ⌋. With this in mind, we get
In view of (29),
holds for all n sufficiently large and ℓ ≤ µrn 2βc log n . Hence, on the same range we have
Reporting these into (91) we get 
Since µ r , β, c > 0, such a selection is permissible given that (90) holds for any positive integer R.
The case where
µr n 2βc log n + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ min{L n , ⌊νn⌋}
We now consider the range where µrn 2βc log n < ℓ ≤ min{L n , ⌊νn⌋} for some 0 < ν < 1/2 to be specified later; see (100). From (70), we see that X ℓ,n = ⌊βℓK 1,n ⌋ so that (91) still holds. Using (91) and (29) on the given range, we get 
for all n sufficiently large. With µ r > 0, it always holds that 1 − µ r + µ r e 
10.4
The case where min{L n , ⌊νn⌋} + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L n Our next goal is to handle the range min{L n , ⌊νn⌋} + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L n , where it still holds that X ℓ,n = ⌊βℓK 1,n ⌋. This range will become obsolete if L n ≤ ⌊νn⌋, so we only consider the case where ⌊νn⌋ < L n , and hence the range ⌊νn⌋ + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L n . On this range, we use the crude bound |Σ| n ≥ K 1,n to get 
where we also note that n − ℓ ≥ 
Under the enforced condition (11) on the scaling we have that Finally, we consider the range L n + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n 2 , where we have X ℓ,n = ⌊γP n ⌋ as stated in (70). Using once again the crude bound |Σ| n ≥ K 1,n we get 
In view of (105) and (88) 
As before, we have under (10) and (11) In order to establish this, we will show that either of the conditions (7) or (14) individually imply λ 1 (n) ∼ Since µ j > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , r, (A.1) will follow immediately if we show under either (7) or (14) that p 1j (n) ∼ K 1,n K j,n P n , j = 1, . . . , r.
(A.2) Lemma 4.2 readily gives (A.2) as we note that for all j = 1, . . . , r, (7) implies p 1j (n) = o(1) while (14) implies 
